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This article examines the UK Film Council’s objective to reorganise and reallo-
cate public funding for ﬁlm from 2000 onwards. I argue that the model adopted
by the UKFC was innovative on two levels. First, it separated public funds
available for ﬁlm production into three separate streams and then hired industry
professionals to head each individual fund. I also examine how the funds devel-
oped over the lifetime of the organisation, with each appointed head shaping
the principles of their respective funds in accordance with the wider objectives
of the UKFC. Drawing on strategy documents, internal papers and interviews
with key personnel, I argue that the UKFC worked to position itself as a ‘van-
guard organisation’ seeking to shake up an independent sector seemingly reliant
on state handouts and introduce a commercial perspective to the industry. This
mission met an abrupt end, however, when the incoming Coalition government
closed down the organisation in 2010.
Keywords: UK Film Council; ﬁlm policy; public bodies; ﬁlm production;
creative industries
Introduction
This article takes as its focus the UK Film Council’s organisation and allocation of
public funding for ﬁlm. Established in 2000 by a New Labour government, the
UKFC was the lead body for ﬁlm until its closure by a Conservative-led Coalition
in 2011. In this period it acted as both an advocate for the ﬁlm industry and a dis-
tributor of public funding for ﬁlm production after taking over the administration of
Lottery funding from the Arts Council of England (ACE) and incorporating exist-
ing ﬁlm investment bodies, British Screen Finance and the BFI’s Production
Department. Drawing on published strategy documents, internal reports and unprec-
edented access to key UKFC personnel and ﬁlm industry stakeholders, I begin by
contextualising the creation of the UK Film Council and examining the expertise
and individuals chosen to lead the organisation. I argue that the original model
adopted by the UKFC in terms of organising and allocating public support for ﬁlm
was innovative on two levels. First, it separated public funds available for ﬁlm pro-
duction into three separate streams and second, hired industry professionals to head
each individual fund. In doing so, the UKFC worked to position itself as a
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‘vanguard organisation’ seeking to professionalise an independent sector that had
seemingly become reliant on state handouts.
On outlining the often contrasting perspectives of the UK independent sector,
however, I go on to analyse how the funds developed over the lifetime of the orga-
nisation with phase two offering an opportunity to re-evaluate the rationale behind
each one and pursue new strategies. As such, each appointed head shaped the prin-
ciples of their respective funds according to both the wider objectives of the
UKFC, but also their own individual background and skill set. This culminated in
2010, ﬁrst with the internal decision to merge the three streams in an attempt to
deal with a decrease in government funding; and second, the incoming Coalition
government’s decision to abolish the UKFC, with responsibility for public funding
for ﬁlm eventually transferring to the British Film Institute in 2011.
A shifting model: contextualising the UK Film Council
The UK Film Council was created following the report of the Film Policy Review
Group (FPRG) set-up by New Labour’s Culture Secretary, Chris Smith, shortly
after coming to power in 1997. While there is a paragraph near the end of A Bigger
Picture (1998, p. 50) calling for the ‘rationalisation of Government machinery in
the longer term’, there is dispute over how this came to be included. The accepted
narrative is that the creation of one ‘superbody’ responsible for all aspects of ﬁlm
in the UK was a key recommendation of the report (Dickinson and Harvey 2005,
Hill 2012). However, as outlined by both Doyle (2014) and Schlesinger (2015),
there was little or no discussion of this during the deliberations of the various sub-
groups set-up to discuss ﬁlm policy more generally. Instead, the conversation about
rationalisation had begun much earlier within the Labour party itself and between
Smith and a number of advisors.
The idea of a single body responsible for ﬁlm can be traced to the mid-1970s,
when Labour leader Harold Wilson set-up a working party to ‘report back on the
future needs of the industry and its relationship with government’ (Barber 2013,
p. 31). A key recommendation of the subsequent Terry Report (1976) was the crea-
tion of a British Film Authority, but Wilson resigned before this could be put in
place. While his successor, James Callaghan, sought to follow-up the proposals
through the Interim Action Committee (IAC), the plans remained unrealised when
Labour lost the 1979 general election (Barber 2013, p. 34). Instead, the IAC was
succeeded by the British Screen Advisory Council (BSAC), which was initially
administered by the Department of Trade and Industry before transmuting in 1985
into its current form as ‘an industrial advisory body funded by the audio-visual
industry’ (Dry 1995, p. 125). Fiona Clarke-Hackston (interview, 19 March 2013),
Chief Executive of BSAC, suggests that for certain stakeholders within the ﬁlm
industry, ‘it was thought more likely that Labour [on coming to power again]
would create some sort of overarching body’ and the continuation of BSAC meant
there ‘would be something there to build on’. However, by the time consultations
began in the late 1990s regarding the creation of a single organisation, BSAC’s
remit had expanded to include television, video and cable (with games and new
media latterly introduced) and was thus no longer best placed to focus solely on
ﬁlm.
Alternative plans for a new ﬁlm body were also proposed in 1996 by Wilf
Stevenson (Nowell-Smith 2012, p. 294), who was then Director of the BFI and is
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now a Labour peer. His proposal was for a British Film Agency, however, with the
Centre nationale de la cinematographie (CNC) in France as a model. As explained
by Stevenson (interview, 12 Feb 2013), this approach was made up of various
‘strands of thinking’. First ‘the government of the day was trying to make too
many decisions which could be devolved if there was an agency around to do that’.
Second, ‘since the development of [Margaret Thatcher’s] Downing Street seminar
[for ﬁlm in 1990], we had a number of additional ﬁlm bodies’; this included the
British Film Commission, which was responsible for inward investment and British
Screen Finance, a public/private partnership set-up to replace the National Film
Finance Corporation. Third, following the recent introduction of National Lottery
funds for ﬁlm production by John Major, Stevenson was developing the ‘BFI 2000
project which was to try and anticipate the development of the Lottery and use that
to invest heavily in ﬁlm culture’. Feeling there was an ‘unhealthy split between the
commercial sector [ ] and the BFI which was seen as very much an educational
charity’, Stevenson believed the creation of a single institution would be of beneﬁt
to ﬁlm in the UK as a whole.
Around the same time, developments north of the border led to the creation of
Scottish Screen, which was established in 1997 ‘as the national body for the pro-
motion of the screen industries in Scotland’ (Hibberd 2008, p. 80) and brought
together the functions of the Scottish Film Council, the Scottish Film Production
Fund, Scottish Screen Locations and Scottish Broadcast and Film Training. Hibberd
(2008, p. 80) notes how ‘the absence of “ﬁlm” from Scottish Screen’s title
acknowledged the increased convergence of media’, yet it is debatable whether this
was ever put into practice, as throughout its duration ﬁlm tended to be the agency’s
primary focus. Nevertheless, its title did allow for the possibility of following
BSAC’s wider screen industries remit at some stage before it was subsumed within
Creative Scotland in 2010. The creation of one uniﬁed body had been recom-
mended by the Hydra Associates (1996) report, Scotland on Screen, and thus set a
precedent for rationalisation. It was during this period that conversations between
Chris Smith and John Woodward (interview, 13 Feb 2013), then CEO of the Pro-
ducers Alliance for Cinema and Television (PACT), led to Woodward commission-
ing the same team to review the potential structures of government support for the
UK ﬁlm industry. The subsequent report (Hydra Associates 1997) put forward a
number of options, one of which was the creation of a uniﬁed agency.
As I have demonstrated, this proposed uniﬁed approach to ﬁlm support in the
UK could have taken a variety of forms. Yet, with the creation of the UKFC, Smith
eschewed both Stevenson’s plans for a reimagined BFI utilising Lottery money to
invest in ﬁlm culture and indeed BSAC’s and Scottish Screen’s incorporation of a
converged media landscape. Instead, the UKFC took the form of a dedicated body,
which sought to highlight the perceived special status of ﬁlm and which was more
concerned with its commercial, rather than cultural signiﬁcance. Of course, this
focus was already evident in Smith’s formation of the FPRG, which was speciﬁ-
cally set-up to provide an action plan for the ﬁlm industry and the various discus-
sions he had been engaged in with industry stakeholders. As such, Schlesinger
(2015) argues that the FPRG worked to provide ‘a framework for endorsing a key
policy already decided on, as opposed to actually discovering the need for a new
agency through a deliberative process’. Moreover, Dickinson and Harvey (2005,
p. 425) highlight how the UK Film Council was not subjected to ‘parliamentary
and Civil Service scrutiny’ as New Labour did not present a bill on the creation of
International Journal of Cultural Policy 3
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a new ﬁlm body. This meant that the organisation was ‘negotiated with quite a nar-
row range of trade interests’ (Dickinson and Harvey 2005, p. 425).
As I will go on to argue, the creation of the UKFC and appointment of its ﬁrst
board and senior executive emerged from what Schlesinger (2015) describes as a
‘network of connections, based on a shared diagnosis of the ills of the UK ﬁlm
industry and what was needed to cure them’. This resulted in a somewhat implicit
mission to ‘professionalise’ the UK independent sector by drawing on industry
expertise and creating three separate funding streams to invest in development, sup-
port new talent and encourage more commercial modes of ﬁlm-making.
Rationalisation, expertise and ‘aspiration’
The Film Council (renamed the UK Film Council in 2003) opened its doors in April
2000 as a non-departmental public body working at arm’s length from the govern-
ment. In doing so, it incorporated the British Film Commission, which was estab-
lished in 1991 to promote inward investment and three existing bodies investing in
ﬁlm production. The longest running of these was the BFI’s Production Department
(previously Production Board), which had become a stand-alone department in the
1970s specialising in ‘experimental and low budget material’ (Wickham 2003, p. 9).
This is despite the fact that the BFI had been involved in ﬁlm funding and produc-
tion as a ‘minor and rather unofﬁcial activity’ since the 1950s (Dupin 2012, p. 197).
British Screen Finance, on the other hand, was set-up by the Thatcher government
in 1985 to replace the National Film Finance Corporation. The result became what
Simon Perry (Macnab 2013), CEO of the organisation between 1991 and 2000,
describes as ‘an accidentally interesting model of private/public partnership’ with
Rank, EMI, Channel 4 and Granada becoming investors, while the company
received a direct government grant of £2 million per year over its lifetime. Finally,
the Arts Council of England’s Lottery Film Department had only been in operation
since 1995 when John Major introduced Lottery funding for ﬁlm and charged the
Arts Council’s of England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland with distributing
funds. In addition to investing in individual ﬁlm projects, the Arts Council of Eng-
land (ACE) set-up the ﬁlm production franchises scheme in 1997 which allocated
£92 million of funding to three franchises over six years (Caterer 2011).
The UKFC also assumed overall responsibility for the BFI with the latter now
receiving its funding through the newly established Film Council, which also
appointed the chair of its board. This rather awkward set-up was problematic in
terms of the creation of a uniﬁed agency as, unlike the other bodies wholly sub-
sumed within the UKFC, the BFI still retained its formal autonomy as an indepen-
dent charity promoting ﬁlm culture and heritage and governed by Royal Charter.
However, this structure allowed the UKFC (2000, p. 1) to delegate its cultural and
educational remit to the BFI, while it focused primarily on the commercial ﬁlm
industry through a ‘two-stage plan of action’. Before examining the UKFC’s initial
plan in more detail, I want to ﬁrst consider how the underlying principles behind the
formation of the UKFC impacted on its overall approach to ﬁlm support in the UK.
Schlesinger (2015) argues that ‘two logics legitimised the creation of the
UKFC: rationalisation and expertise’. The ﬁrst of these, the logic of rationalisation,
is ‘based on the belief that one agency is better than many because it may concen-
trate resources and pursue more effective strategic action. This logic also involves a
process of disavowal and taking distance from superseded bodies judged to be
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ineffective’. To illustrate this logic, Chris Smith (Macnab 2010, p. 3) explains how
he believed there was a need for two things:
One was much greater coherence – hence the idea of bringing everything together
under one roof. Second, I wanted to make sure that we brought what one might call
the artistic side of British ﬁlm-making together with the more commercial side so that
each could usefully feed off the other.
The latter is perhaps a comment about the performance of larger established cul-
tural organisations, such as the BFI and ACE, when dealing with the commercial
aspect of the ﬁlm industry. For example, Caterer (2011, p. 9) usefully outlines the
dominant assumption around lottery funding from the mid-1990s onwards, which
Caterer himself ﬁnds unfair, namely, ‘that it was a terrible misjudgement to allow
antiquated cultural institutions like the Arts Councils to have any responsibility
over a large-scale economic activity, such as ﬁlmmaking’. In contrast, I will dem-
onstrate how the UKFC sought to position itself as a relatively small and dynamic
organisation that could respond quickly to issues and was unafraid to challenge
existing Lottery guidelines or at least interpret them differently from ACE.
This leads to the UKFC’s second logic which was that of ‘expertise’. Again,
Schlesinger (2015) explains what applying this logic entailed:
First, ﬁnding fault with (and disavowing) the know-how and practice of existing agen-
cies. Second, it set a value on speciﬁc kinds of expertise as especially credible and
effective, thus legitimising them. The next task was to ﬁnd the right exemplars of
embodied knowledge by choosing particular individuals to undertake the necessary
task of transformation.
One of the key priorities of the newly formed UKFC was to introduce a profession-
alism that was seen to be lacking in both the UK ﬁlm industry and the way in
which the Arts Council distributed lottery funding. With regards to the latter, Petley
(2002) highlights the sustained media campaign in some quarters that criticised not
only the content of British ﬁlms, but also the fact that many were in receipt of pub-
lic funding. By the time of the UKFC’s launch in 2000, Petley (2002, p. 42)
explains that the sums of money allegedly ‘wasted’ on British ﬁlms ‘had become
ﬁrmly established on the news agenda’ and changing this perception became one of
the most pressing issues for the new body given the high-proﬁle nature of its role
as a Lottery distributor.
Following on from the FPRG, however, there was also a sense that the UK ﬁlm
industry required structural change if a ‘truly durable business sector’ was to be
achieved (UKFC 2000, p. 1). While this was undoubtedly a longer term undertak-
ing, the initial strategic mission handed down to the agency by the Department of
Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) was ‘to develop a sustainable UK ﬁlm industry’
(UKFC 2000, p. 5), which caused some confusion within the wider sector. The
term ‘sustainable’ was unhelpful because, as explained by CEO John Woodward
(interview, 13 Feb 2013), it ‘lacks any kind of clarity’. Without a satisfactory deﬁ-
nition provided by the government, the notion of sustainability was difﬁcult to
achieve as it could be interpreted in various ways. For example, Barratt (2010)
helpfully distinguishes between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ conceptions of sustainability, with
the former implying ‘an enterprise capable of perpetuating itself (and, ideally, grow-
ing) without outside support or inﬂuence’ and the latter suggesting ‘a given state
International Journal of Cultural Policy 5
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can be maintained at a desired level without exhausting available resources’. For
the UK ﬁlm industry, Woodward (interview, 13 Feb 2013) notes how a pathway to
the former appeared unrealistic as ‘there is no historical precedent for ﬁlm indus-
tries that are self sustaining without public subsidy and support’. However, Stewart
Till (interview, 27 March 2013), Deputy Chair and then Chair of the organisation
from its inception until 2009, believes that the overall goal was not to ‘wean UK
independent producers entirely off the need for public subsidy’, but was instead
about ‘establishing the right sort of aspiration’.
This ‘aspiration’ was undoubtedly skewed towards commercial ﬁlm-making, as
evident in the expertise sought to lead the organisation. In the ﬁrst instance, Smith
installed Hollywood director Alan Parker as Chair and Stewart Till of PolyGram
Filmed Entertainment as his deputy along with John Woodward, formerly of PACT,
as CEO. While Till had overseen the FPRG along with the Films Minister Tom
Clarke, both Parker and Woodward had recently assumed the same roles at the BFI
which Parker (interview, 11 March 2013) describes as an ‘old moribund ineffectual
organisation … [where] you couldn’t change anything’. With that in mind, Parker
(interview, 11 March 2013) expressed a preference for leading the new organisation
and set about securing a board ‘made up of cutting edge professional ﬁlm-makers,
producers, directors, distributors, it really was the best people’. Jenny Borgars
(interview, 3 Dec 2013), who was Head of the UKFC’s Development Fund
(2000–2007), expands on this:
When [the DCMS] put the Film Council board together it made a very bold statement
because they brought very, very successful industry practitioners into it. So if you
think about that ﬁrst Board, it was Tim Bevan [of Universal subsidiary Working
Title], Paul Webster who was running Film4, there was Chris Auty who was running
one of the franchises [The Film Consortium]. There was Duncan Kenworthy, one of
the most successful [UK] producers [and co-founder of ﬁlm franchise DNA Films], I
mean there was Sarah Radclyffe [co-founder of Working Title and aligned with the
third ﬁlm franchise Pathe Pictures] … basically, it was your wish list of the high
hitters in the industry.
Before going on to consider how the presence of such ‘high hitters’ impacted on
the rhetoric espoused by the UKFC and indeed the often contrasting perspectives
this prompted both inside and outside of the organisation, I ﬁrst want to examine
the initial strategy relating to the reorganisation and reallocation of public support
for ﬁlm and how this was implemented throughout the tenure period of the original
appointed heads.
UKFC funding streams: phase 1
In terms of the reorganisation and reallocation of Lottery funds, the model adopted
by the UKFC was innovative on two levels. First, it separated lottery funds into
three different streams in the form of the Development, New Cinema and Premiere
Funds and then hired industry professionals to head each one. In the ﬁrst instance,
the decision to create a fund purely for development was particularly welcomed by
industry stakeholders as a lack of support in this area had been identiﬁed by the
FPRG (1998) as a major weakness within the UK ﬁlm industry. The New Cinema
Fund, on the other hand, was more of a continuation of the work carried out by
British Screen, the BFI and ACE, with its focus on low-budget features within the
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tradition of cultural ﬁlm-making and a commitment to working with talent outside
the mainstream. In what was perceived as a relatively new approach, the Premiere
Fund pursued a more commercial strategy, as it sought to facilitate the production
of popular mainstream British ﬁlms and ‘attract signiﬁcant audiences at home and
abroad’ (UKFC 2000, p. 14).
By delegating decision-making for investment to qualiﬁed professionals (UKFC
2000, p. 14), the organisation also distanced itself from its predecessors in a num-
ber of ways. For example, ACE had lacked expertise in ﬁlm-making and thus out-
sourced decision-making to a committee. As explained by one such member,
BSAC’s Clarke-Hackston (interview, 19 March 2013), the committee met once a
month having spent all weekend reading paperwork for no remuneration, but felt
bound by lottery constraints as to the types of projects they could approve. This
led to some questionable decisions that, as outlined by Petley (2002), were seized
on by the media.
British Screen Finance, on the other hand, was a much smaller outﬁt of around
14 staff with less money at its disposal, but was nevertheless relatively successful
in its investments (Minns 2000). However, it was synonymous with one person, its
CEO Simon Perry, a situation which, according to Borgars (interview, 3 Dec 2013),
was ‘both the joy but also the problem with [the organisation]’ because decision-
making appeared to lie in the hands of just one individual. The BFI’s Film Produc-
tion Department had, of course, a long history of supporting cultural ﬁlms and had
gained particular success at certain points over the years (Dupin 2012). However, it
lacked experience of investing in commercial ﬁlm-making and – as indicated by
Parker (interview, 11 March 2013) – there was a feeling that as a large organisa-
tion, it was too big to affect change quickly. For example, for the year 2000, the
BFI had 403 members of staff funded by DCMS grant and operating income work-
ing across ﬁlm exhibition, collections, education, production and associated admin-
istration and services (BFI 2000). By contrast, the UKFC had 54 management and
administration staff in its ﬁrst year of operation (UKFC 2001). Thus, as a new and
smaller organisation bringing in industry expertise and with a decidedly commercial
outlook, the UKFC sought to usher in a new era of public support for ﬁlm.
Development fund
With an allocation of £5 million per year, the Development Fund became one of
the largest of its type in Europe and was headed by Jenny Borgars, previously a
development executive for British Screen. While this suggests a degree of continu-
ity with what had gone before, British Screen had a much smaller budget and only
developed material with a view to investing in the production (Finney 1996, p. 23).
In contrast, the UKFC aimed to develop independent projects, which could go on
to seek production investment from a wide range of sources including, but not
limited to, its own production funds.
The development fund not only invested in individual projects, but also a range
of production companies through its slate funding initiative. This was an attempt to
create more ‘sustainable’ production companies, and thus satisfy the UKFC’s wider
objective. As producers within the UK independent sector tended to work on a pro-
ject-by-project basis, slate funding offered production companies a larger sum of
investment (from between £50,000 and £500,000 over the years in which it
operated), which could be used to hire staff, create a culture of development and
International Journal of Cultural Policy 7
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essentially build a slate of projects to work across at any given time. For Borgars
(interview, 3 Dec 2013), the slate funding initiative occurred in two distinct cycles.
The initial approach was simply to back a range of producers and leave it ‘entirely
in the producers’ hands’ as to how to best utilise the money available to them,
while the second cycle became, what she describes as,
a more market driven form of slate funding, wherein we were encouraging producers
to get distribution ﬁnancing feedback at an early stage, we were encouraging them to
do partnership ﬁnancing [or] if they were of a certain size to see if they could [act as
an] umbrella for some of the younger producers.
The difﬁculty with the Development Fund, however, both in terms of slate funding
and individual projects, is that the development process occurs too early in the life
cycle of ﬁlm to judge effectively whether the investment has been a success. As
Borgars (interview, 3 Dec 2013) notes in relation to slate funding in particular, ‘if
you really want to build a company that can work, you give them funding over ten
years, you let them fail miserably for a while and then they will start to get it’.
However, even the Lottery ﬁlm franchises that occurred during ACE’s tenure were
only funded over six years, with success usually coming during the latter stages of
the agreement or indeed once the funding had been concluded (Caterer 2011).
Examples of ﬁlms that the Development Fund invested in during Borgars’s ten-
ure and which went on to be successful include the critically acclaimed The Mag-
dalene Sisters (2002), winner of the Golden Lion at the Venice International Film
Festival and KiDULTHOOD (2006), which performed particularly well at the box
ofﬁce with young adult audiences, a traditionally weak demographic when it comes
to UK ﬁlm. While The Magdalene Sisters went on to secure production funding
from the New Cinema Fund, KiDULTHOOD attracted investment from elsewhere.
Notably, Jonathan Glazer’s critically acclaimed 2014 ﬁlm Under the Skin, featuring
Scarlett Johansson, was in development for such a lengthy period that it ﬁrst
received UKFC funding from Borgars in 2005. Again, this demonstrates the time it
can take before being able to judge whether an investment is successful.
New cinema fund
The New Cinema Fund was allocated £5 million a year to support new talent and
encourage innovative ﬁlm-making through the use of digital technology for low-
budget features and short ﬁlms (UKFC 2000). It also had a ‘strong commitment to
supporting work from the regions and from black, Asian and other ethnic minori-
ties’ (UKFC board paper April 2005). Producer Paul Trijbits (interview, 17 Dec
2013) was selected to head the fund having built a reputation for producing ﬁlms
of this kind, in the form of Richard Stanley’s Hardware (1990) and Danny Can-
non’s The Young Americans (1993) which he describes as ‘quite commercially
minded [and] aiming at a wider, younger audience’, thus differentiating them from
‘the movies people were generally making in Britain [at the time]’.
Although the outlines for the three funds were put in place by the original
UKFC board, they lacked a detailed brief, therefore, each fund head was able to
determine how best to utilise the money available to them in accordance with the
wider aims of the organisation. The approach adopted by Trijbits (interview, 17
Dec 2013) was that that New Cinema Fund should create ‘multiple points of entry
for talent; new talent, existing talent … talent we know, talent we didn’t know’,
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and while producing single features was always a key aim, he also set out to create
a broader talent base through a number of short ﬁlm schemes. This included a
nationwide Digital Shorts programme that was run by the nine newly established
Regional Screen Agencies and the more bespoke Cinema Extreme scheme for
advanced ﬁlm-makers. In seeking to react to ongoing developments within the
industry, the New Cinema Fund also made funds available for shorts costing just
£1000 each, as digital technology made it increasingly possible to produce micro-
budget projects. This was in addition to micro-budget features, such as Bille Eltr-
ingham’s experimental This is Not a Love Song (2002), which was majority funded
by the UKFC and became the ﬁrst UK ﬁlm to be simultaneously distributed in cin-
emas and online.
In terms of developing feature ﬁlm talent, the New Cinema Fund also had a
number of successes during Trijbits’s tenure. For example, he invested in Bloody
Sunday (2002) by Paul Greengrass, who went on to direct two ﬁlms in the Bourne
ﬁlm franchise and Red Road (2006) by Andrea Arnold, who was awarded the Jury
Prize at Cannes for both this, her ﬁrst feature, and her follow-up ﬁlm Fish Tank
(2009). The groundbreaking documentary Touching the Void (2003) by Kevin
MacDonald was an example of the type of experimental ﬁlm-making encouraged
by the fund, while the award winning A Way of Life (2004), by Ghanaian-British
director Amma Asante, demonstrated its commitment to diversity, with Asante
going on to direct the acclaimed period drama Belle (2014) dealing with race and
class in eighteenth century Britain.
Premiere fund
The Premiere Fund had a larger allocation of £10 million to encourage the produc-
tion of proﬁtable ﬁlms, a difﬁcult thing to achieve even for Hollywood studios,
which are able to spread risk and generate revenue through various streams. It was
particularly tricky in the UK context, however, given the strict guidelines around
Lottery funding. For example, as outlined by Caterer (2011, p. 22), ACE and Brit-
ish Screen had attempted something similar in the mid-1990s through the experi-
mental scheme The Greenlight Fund:
The idea behind this fund was to attract directors of ‘international repute’ into the
industry through larger awards made to ﬁlms between £3 million and £10 million …
However, the Greenlight Fund was difﬁcult to reconcile with British Screen’s policy
of ‘additionality’: the idea that ‘Money could only be granted if the ﬁlm would other-
wise not be made.’
If a ﬁlm was supposedly commercial with a relatively high budget and key talent
attached, then the market was expected to oblige with regards to funding. Yet, as
Caterer (2011, p. 113) goes on to suggest, the UKFC was able to adopt such an
approach just ﬁve years later as the concept of additionality had become ‘less polit-
ically charged’, while the solicitation of projects, ‘once considered a dangerous step
towards “croney-ism”’, was now regarded as strategically vital to the success of
Lottery funding for ﬁlm. Nevertheless, in contrast to the Development and New
Cinema Funds, the rationale behind the Premiere Fund was trickier to defend with
regards to the distribution of public money, therefore the focus was as much on
‘attracting audiences’ as it was on generating proﬁts (UKFC 2000, p. 14).
International Journal of Cultural Policy 9
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 G
las
go
w]
 at
 09
:37
 10
 M
arc
h 2
01
5 
Against this backdrop, the Premiere Fund was headed by Robert Jones, the
executive producer of Sirens (1993), The Usual Suspects (1995) and Hard Eight
(1996) who also had experience of ﬁlm distribution, acquisition and ﬁnancing. With
an original investment ceiling of £1 million per ﬁlm, the aim was to invest in eight
to ten ﬁlms per year ranging in budget from £1 to £8 million. However, one of the
ﬁrst awards made by Jones was of £2 million to the costume drama Gosford Park
(2001) by Hollywood director Robert Altman, a decision that proved prudent as the
ﬁlm not only went on to win an Oscar, Golden Globe and BAFTA, but also fully
recouped its UKFC investment by 2003. This early success was crucial as it gave
the nascent organisation the hit ﬁlm it needed and began to generate more positive
media coverage for Lottery funding for ﬁlm.
This was followed by further awards which broke the original investment ceil-
ing of £1 million, most notably the animation Valiant (£2.5 million), family ﬁlm
Five Children and It (£2.1 million), The Constant Gardener (£1.9 million) by Fer-
nando Meirelles and Mike Leigh’s Vera Drake (£1.2 million). Of these, the latter
two performed best, attracting numerous awards and critical acclaim, while also
recouping part of their investment. Other ﬁlms were not as well-received, however,
such as the controversial Sex Lives of the Potato Men (2004), which was awarded
over £1.5 million from the Premiere Fund and was dubbed ‘one of the worst ﬁlms
ever made’ (Humphries 2004). Hill (2012, p. 339) explains that although it was
defended by the UKFC ‘on the grounds that it would appeal to young working-
class males rather than middle-aged, middle-class critics (and the ﬁlm did, it seems,
eventually turn a proﬁt on the back of video and DVD sales)’, it also demonstrates
‘how the funding of a ﬁlm on an apparently “commercial” basis could nonetheless
attract considerable hostility from the very same newspapers that had previously
lamented the lack of commercial success of Lottery-funded ﬁlms’.
One issue that arose in relation to the hiring of professionals was that, in the
case of the New Cinema and Premiere Funds, both Trijbits and Jones were given
executive producer credits for the ﬁlms they chose to invest in, despite dispensing
public money. On speaking to both, there was a feeling that as practitioners, they
had been hired for their production expertise and were actively involved in making
the ﬁlms happen by helping raise the necessary ﬁnance. Being able to do this,
rather than simply ‘ticking boxes’, as phrased by Jones (interview, 19 Dec 2013),
was what made the role attractive. Nevertheless, it attracted controversy within the
independent sector as I will now discuss.
The rhetoric of the UKFC: inside and outside perspectives
Having carried out almost 50 interviews over the course of a wider research project
with UKFC board members, senior executives, policy-makers and ﬁlm industry
stakeholders, what emerged was often contrasting perspectives of how those within
the organisation viewed the UKFC and the opinions of the wider ﬁlm community.
This is important because as a uniﬁed body, the UKFC performed the dual role of
providing strategic leadership for the industry, while also acting as a Lottery
distributor investing in particular projects, schemes and initiatives. Yet, the
organisation often struggled to articulate its position to the various constituencies
which make up the wider UK ﬁlm industry, with its mission to ‘professionalise’ the
industry remaining implicit, rather than explicit. This difﬁculty was also highlighted
by the DCMS in its 2007 Peer Review: ‘should [the UKFC] promote ﬁlm
10 L.W. Kelly
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 G
las
go
w]
 at
 09
:37
 10
 M
arc
h 2
01
5 
production generally or protect British ﬁlm? It should do both, whilst improving
relations with smaller, indie producers’ (see Olsberg SPI and Barratt 2010, p. 93).
Thus, it was the relationship with the independent sector, which was largely reliant
on public funding for production, which proved the most difﬁcult with independent
producers being vocal in their criticism of the organisation.
Producer Tanya Seghatchian (interview, 9 Jan 2014), Head of the Development
Fund between 2007 and 2010, perhaps best sums up how the UKFC sought to see
itself when she describes it as a ‘vanguard organisation’:
It was the ﬁrst and only time really that there was a cohesive group of people who
were going to act as change agents for the beneﬁt of the industry as a whole, and to
take on board all the interested parties and all the vested interests and enable us to
create a viable cross-sector industry.
Jenny Borgars (interview, 3 Dec 2013), who preceded Seghatchian in the same role,
similarly explains how from its inception, the UKFC
deliberately took a stance to say ‘we are a shining new beacon for how public money
is going to be invested in ﬁlm’ and a very aggressive stance in effectively saying,
‘these are the ﬂaws that we judge in the industry as it stands [and] there are things
we are seeking to change and address’.
This is echoed by Robert Jones (interview, 19 Dec 2013), Head of the Premiere
Fund from 2000 to 2005, who states ‘from an internal point of view I think, at the
beginning, there was a real crusading sense amongst many of us because it felt like
there was a ship that needed turning round in the way things were approached in
the industry’.
This discourse, which highlights the need for ‘change’ within the industry and
particular ‘ﬂaws’ to be addressed (in addition to Jones’s nautical metaphor), is
encapsulated in Parker’s (UKFC 2000, p. 1) foreword to the agency’s ﬁrst public
statement in which he declares, ‘sometimes within the UK ﬁlm industry it’s hard to
know if we’re waving or drowning’. While many saw this rhetoric as ‘brave’ or
‘bold’, in that it was explicit about shaking up the industry, others felt it tipped
over into ‘arrogance’ or ‘hubris’, with these being the most frequent terms to arise
in interviews with UK independent producers, many of whom also served on the
UKFC board at one time or another. According to one such producer and board
member,
there was the feeling that the UKFC arrived and they were the professionals, because
they were largely people who had come from the studio system where money is never
an issue, everything is well capitalised, decisions can be made quickly. (interviewee
16, 12 March 2013)
For those working in the UK ﬁlm sector then, an under-capitalised industry relying
on public subsidy, what resulted was to a certain extent an ‘us and them’ situation
making it difﬁcult to work collaboratively with producers. As explained by another
producer and board member (interviewee 12, 19 Feb 2013), ‘there was an extre-
mely arrogant assumption that the [UKFC] executives knew better than the constit-
uents they were serving … which was ironic because that’s where they were all
recruited from’. John McVay (interview, 12 March 2013), CEO of the producers
association PACT, supports this view explaining how, in his opinion, UKFC
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executives were essentially saying to the indigenous production sector, ‘we will
give you money but you’re not making the sort of ﬁlms we think you should be
making. Which, to me, is hubris of the worst sort in any kind of public agency’.
It was important, therefore, to have tenure periods for the funds so that they did
not become associated with particular individuals or seen to promote certain types
of projects and the introduction of new fund heads between 2005 and 2007 offered
an opportunity to re-evaluate the rationale behind each one and deliberately pursue
new strategies. In doing so, Phase 2 saw the end of executive producer credits and
the recruitment of fund heads with different backgrounds and skill sets to their pre-
decessors. Moreover, since 2004, both the Development and Premiere Funds had
experienced a reduction in the money available to them, with the former now hav-
ing £4 million to spend and the latter £8 million, while the New Cinema Fund
remained the same (UKFC 2004). As outlined below, these changes resulted in a
slight shift from the rhetoric around industry expertise, which had been the deﬁning
characteristic of the UKFC’s distribution of public funds, to a stronger acknowl-
edgement of the public service element of the role and an attempt to create a more
supportive environment for the independent sector by providing smaller investments
across a wider range of projects.
UKFC funding streams: phase 2
The Development Fund saw Borgars succeeded by Tanya Seghatchian, producer of
the award winning British ﬁlm My Summer of Love (2004), who was also instru-
mental in bringing the Harry Potter franchise to the big screen. As a practitioner
with ﬁrst-hand experience of the development process, her appointment on one
level is indicative of the UKFC’s tradition of delegating decision-making to quali-
ﬁed professionals. However, on discussing her reasons for joining the agency after
being involved in one of the most successful franchises in ﬁlm history, Seghatchian
(interview, 9 Jan 2014) explicitly acknowledges the ‘public service’ nature of the
role, viewing the UKFC as ‘absolutely the environment in which I’d be able to
give back to my industry’. With this in mind, Seghatchian (interview, 9 Jan 2014)
was largely welcomed by the independent sector due to her attempts to provide
more autonomy for those ﬁlm-makers securing investment from the Development
Fund:
My primary objective was to create a distinction between the ﬁrst timers and new-
comers who I felt needed more support … and the more experienced individuals who
I felt could probably manage things very effectively on their own … So I put in a dis-
tinction between ﬁrst time screenwriters and ﬁlm-makers, and experienced practitio-
ners, which hadn’t existed before.
This approach arose from having been involved in the process from the ‘other side’
during times as a producer when she would have appreciated further intervention
from funders or indeed felt more experienced than those providing investment. As
such, applications from emerging talent were assessed quarterly, while those from
more established practitioners were reviewed on a rolling basis.
During her tenure, Seghatchian also sought to revise the Development Fund’s
approach to slate funding, replacing it with the Vision Awards scheme. The original
slate funding initiative was in some ways reminiscent of ACE’s ﬁlm franchise
scheme, albeit on a much smaller scale, and over its two cycles exchanged an
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initial ‘hands off’ style for a more ‘market driven approach’ highlighting speciﬁc
objectives. Seghatchian (interview, 9 Jan 2014) still felt however that while the ini-
tiative had been ‘useful for the period it had been in place … [awards] were essen-
tially favouring the bigger companies with relationships with distributors and sales
companies built in’. In an attempt, therefore, to use public money to create more
diversity in the independent sector, the Vision Awards sought to invest less funds
across more production companies if they could ‘demonstrate strong talent relation-
ships and a [particular] vision [that ﬁlled] strategic gaps in the industry’.
This notion of less investment across a wider range of projects and companies
was to characterise Phase 2 of the UKFC’s funding streams. For example, at the
New Cinema Fund producer Trijbits was replaced in 2006 by Lenny Crooks, who
came from a public sector background, having run the Glasgow Film Ofﬁce and
established the Glasgow Film Fund, which successfully leveraged public and pri-
vate investment for ﬁlm production. In contrast, perhaps, to his predecessor, Crooks
(interview, 27 Jan 2014) not only saw himself as a public servant, but was explicit
about the fact that those employed by the UKFC should be aware of their public
service role: ‘My view, coming in, was that the Funds had begun to overlook the
public service element, becoming a little bit studio-like’. In part, he felt this had
created less distinction between Premiere and New Cinema Fund ﬁlms as the latter
had begun to move towards the ‘centre ground’.
In an attempt then to reconnect with the original objectives laid out for the fund
in 2000, namely to discover new talent, utilise digital technology and work outside
the mainstream, Crooks (interview, 27 Jan 2014) explains how he sought to invest
in a wider range of lower budget ﬁlms:
Before handover, the average budget for a New Cinema Fund ﬁlm was £2.7 million
and [the UKFC] put over £550,000 into each ﬁlm. After I came in, the average bud-
get was £1.1 million and we put in £350,000 … that gives the numerical sense of us
pulling away from the centre ground, and that gave us a greater space in terms of per-
ception between what the New Cinema Fund and the Premiere Fund was.
Applicants were also required to present a clear festival strategy as this was consid-
ered the best way for non-mainstream ﬁlms to gain critical attention and reach an
international market. During Crooks’s tenure at the New Cinema Fund, this
approach gained considerable success, most notably with James Marsh’s documen-
tary Man on Wire (2008), which was awarded both the Grand Jury Prize and Audi-
ence Award at the Sundance Film Festival before securing US distribution. With
successful box ofﬁce returns, Man on Wire not only went on to fully recoup its
UKFC investment, but also won an Oscar and BAFTA. Other examples of the
diversity of ﬁlms the New Cinema Fund invested in include: AdULTHOOD (2008),
Noel Clarke’s successful follow-up to KiDULTHOOD, political comedy In The
Loop (2009), a spin-off from the BBC television series The Thick of It (2005–) and
Andrea Arnold’s award-winning second feature Fish Tank, with the latter two also
receiving development funding from the UKFC.
A similar shift had also occurred at the Premiere Fund where producer Jones
was replaced in 2005 by Sally Caplan (interview, 29 Nov 2007), who came from a
distribution and acquisitions background and saw her role as investing in ﬁlms that
would ‘connect more with audiences’. As such, her primary concern was generating
box ofﬁce ﬁgures and international sales for cinema, DVD and television, rather
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than securing critical acclaim, festival selection and awards success. In contrast to
the £2 million given to the award-winning Gosford Park, which now represented a
quarter of Caplan’s £8 million budget, her approach echoed that of Seghatchian and
Crooks, as she felt it more appropriate to invest less money into a higher number
of ﬁlms. It is important to note that the wider economic landscape had changed
during this period, with the second set of fund heads experiencing a more pressured
environment as the recession and subsequent global ﬁnancial crisis made it harder
to ﬁnd ﬁnancing for ﬁlms. Thus, although the UKFC’s Business Affairs department
had always been involved in approving the investments made by each individual
fund, it was particularly vital that those ﬁlms at the commercial, rather than cultural
end of the spectrum had a ‘plausible ﬁnancial plan’ in place before the UKFC com-
mitted money (Caplan interview, 29 Nov 2007).
Examples of the type of commercial ﬁlms the Premiere Fund invested over
£1 million in during Caplan’s tenure include: the 2007 reboot of the St Trinian’s
franchise, alien invasion movie Attack the Block (2011) and Streetdance 3D (2010),
which was not only credited with ‘discovering and nurturing new creative talent in
the UK’, but also enjoyed ‘the most successful opening weekend of any ﬁlm [the
UKFC] has supported in its 10-year history’ (BBC News 2010). While each of
these examples can be interpreted as equating commercial ﬁlm-making with young
adult cinema-going audiences, the UKFC’s greatest success on an international
scale was the multiple Oscar winning The King’s Speech (2010), a period drama
that received initial investment from the Development Fund followed by £1 million
from the Premiere Fund in 2009.
Yet, at the same time as the UKFC was receiving plaudits for being the only
public funder to recognise the ﬁlm’s potential, both the funding streams and then
the UKFC itself came to an abrupt end due to the impact of the ﬁnancial crisis on
funding for public agencies and the arrival of the Conservative-led Coalition gov-
ernment. In relation to the ﬁrst point, an internal decision was taken in 2010 to
merge the three streams into one uniﬁed Film Fund headed by Seghatchian with
£15m a year to invest. Any concerns the industry may have had regarding how the
available money would now be targeted across development, low-budget and com-
mercial ﬁlm-making proved to be short lived as the Coalition announced the clo-
sure of the Film Council within a matter of months, as part of a cost-cutting drive
designed to improve efﬁciency and reduce costs (Shoard 2010), with responsibility
for Lottery funding and the wider UK ﬁlm sector eventually transferring to the BFI
in 2011.
Conclusion
This account of the creation of the UKFC, its original funding strategy and how
this developed over its lifetime demonstrates some of the issues surrounding the
policy process and the ways in which it is enacted by key individuals. I argue that
the underlying principles behind the formation of the UKFC impacted on its overall
approach to ﬁlm support in the UK, focusing on the commercial aspect of the
industry and providing an action plan that set out to ‘professionalise’ the indepen-
dent sector by incorporating speciﬁc expertise and establishing a certain type of
aspiration. In practice, this was achieved by separating the funding into three
distinct streams to invest in development, support new talent and encourage more
commercial modes of ﬁlm-making, which, through a number of well-chosen
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investments, resulted in several successes that helped turn around media perceptions
of Lottery funding for ﬁlm.
However, the rhetoric and methods employed by the UKFC were not always
welcomed by the very constituents it was supposed to be serving, as the organisa-
tion struggled to articulate its position and appeared to privilege commercial exper-
tise over the public service aspect of distributing public funding. Recognition of
this and a subsequent shift to address such issues in the second phase of the funds
was largely acknowledged by the independent sector, with one experienced inde-
pendent producer explaining how, in the latter years of the UKFC, ‘there was an
attempt to engage in a more supportive way’ (interviewee 30, 12 March 2013). For
others, however, this shift was considered ‘too late’ to affect real change (intervie-
wee 12, 19 Feb 2013), as the UKFC by this time faced reduced funding and even-
tual closure. Moreover, the relatively small amount of public funding available to
the UKFC throughout its tenure was also unlikely to bring around the structural
change required within the industry.
The trajectory of this particular element of the UKFC’s wide-ranging remit is
signiﬁcant for the way in which it illustrates certain tensions relating to public sup-
port for ﬁlm production. First, is the amount of time and funding public agencies
invest in schemes and initiatives before being able to judge whether they have been
a success. Second, is the impact tenure periods have on the types of projects
funded and relationships cultivated with constituents. With regards to the UKFC,
the initial strategy relating to the reorganisation and reallocation of public funds
was revised in Phase 2, offering an opportunity to reﬂect and react to criticisms
within the industry; and indeed, both phases can claim success in different ways.
However, if the overall objective was to develop a ‘sustainable’ industry, in either
its ‘soft’ or ‘hard’ conception (Barratt 2010), then more time and money was
required, but this was made impossible due to political decision-making regarding
reduced funding followed by the eventual abolition of an organisation that was
beginning to ﬁnd its way.
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